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Abstract This paper reflects on the various possible nuclear power production
methods from an ethical perspective. The production and consumption of nuclear
power give rise to the problem of intergenerational justice; in other words, we are
depleting a nonrenewable resource in the form of uranium while the radiotoxic waste
that is generated carries very long-term potential burdens. I argue that the morally
desirable option should therefore be to seek to safeguard the interests of future
generations. The present generation has at least two duties with regard to posterity:
(1) not to jeopardize the safety and security of future generations or impose any
harm upon them and (2) to sustain future well-being insofar as that is possible with
the available energy resources. These duties are presented as pluralist prima facie
duties (or duty-imposing reasons) thus implying that they could well be overruled by
morally more compelling duties. If we are unable to fulfill both these prima facie
duties simultaneously, it should be particularly the duty not to impose harm on
posterity that should be the leading incentive behind nuclear power production. This
supports the arguments in favor of the introduction of a new fuel cycle (partitioning
and transmutation) that can substantially reduce the waste lifetime and therefore also
potential future burdens. However, the further development and application of this
scientifically proven but not yet industrialized fuel cycle give rise to additional
burdens for contemporaries. This paper examines the extent of the moral stringency
of the no harm duty sought for situations in which future interest should guide us in
our choosing of a certain technology.
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The recent nuclear accident in Fukushima Daiichi in Japan has again brought the
nuclear debate to the forefront of controversy. While Japan is trying to avert further
disaster, many nations are reconsidering the future of nuclear power in their region.
The many advantages of nuclear power largely ensue from the fact that large
amounts of energy can be produced from small amounts of fuel while giving rise to
very low greenhouse gas emissions. It is especially in conjunction with the growing
worldwide demand for energy and the mounting climate change concerns that
nuclear power has increasingly attracted attention in recent years. Another important
advantage of nuclear power is that it reduces the reliance that countries have upon
fossil fuel for their energy provision. This is why a country like Japan with almost no
oil and gas reserves has always drawn heavily on nuclear power; one in every eight
of the world’s nuclear power plants is currently in Japan.
Obviously, nuclear power has serious disadvantages too, one needs only think of
the accident risks—the unfolding disaster in Japan speaks for itself—there are
security concerns in relation to the proliferation of nuclear weapons and, indeed,
there is the matter of long-lived waste. In this paper, I do not intend to get involved
in the general desirability debate. I assert that when carefully reflecting on the
desirable energy mix for the future, one needs to reflect on nuclear energy in relation
to other energy sources. In so doing, one should first be aware of the distinctive
aspects of nuclear technology, such as the problems that long-lived waste poses to
future generations. We should furthermore include different technological methods
in the production process (or fuel cycles) as these methods deal differently with the
distinctive aspects.
In this paper, I introduce the desirable option in relation to nuclear power
production, which I shall approach from a moral point of view. In other words, if we
intend to continue with nuclear power production, which technology is most morally
desirable? The latter will be approached from the perspective of the duties of
contemporaries if we are to safeguard the interests of future generations. There are
two basic reasons for focusing on the interest of posterity when addressing the
desirability issue: (1) in producing nuclear power, we are creating an intergenera-
tional problem; namely, the benefits are predominantly for this generation and the
burdens will, in part, be postponed and (2) we are in a temporally beneficiary
position to visit costs on our descendants and can therefore easily exploit this
position. In Section 1, I shall elaborate on this discussion.
The desirable option is therefore primarily perceived to be that of safeguarding
the interests of future generations. It is argued that in choosing the technology for
nuclear power production, there are at least two duties that the present generation
has, namely, to benefit future people and not to harm them. These duties are
presented in Section 2 as pluralist prima facie duties implying, in other words, that
they could be overridden by more compelling duties. In this way, moral pluralism
enables us to address the conflicts. The extent of the moral stringency of the
presented duties is examined in Section 3. That section also questions which of the
two duties should be decisive if they cannot be simultaneously complied with.
Section 4 briefly reviews the existing and future production methods that would
comply with the duties. The application of these technologies shifts the burdens and
benefits for different generations, which can potentially be conflicting. Those
intergenerational conflicts are then explored in Section 5; that section furthermore
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presents three challenges to the idea of imposing additional burdens on the present
generation in order to curtail the harm incurred on future generations. I conclude the
paper by presenting the findings in brief.
The assumption underlying the analysis in this paper is that nuclear power
deployment will continue. This should not, however, be seen as a normative
statement regarding the societal desirability of nuclear power. This assumption is
merely made in order to be able to reflect on the different nuclear power production
methods in a restricted domain. In the discussion section (Section 5), I will return to
this assumption and evaluate whether it paralyzes the analysis.
1 Nuclear Power Production and Temporal Duties
There are two reasons why this generation’s production of nuclear power creates the
problem of intergenerational justice. First of all, if we assume that all generations
(ours and those that follow) have access to the same finite resources (uranium) and
that we might be able to asymmetrically influence their interest, a “Pure
Intergenerational Problem” (PIP), as argued by Gardiner (2003), will emerge, which
is in fact an exacerbated form of the prisoner’s dilemma extended over generations.
He imagines a world consisting of temporally distinct groups that can asymmetri-
cally influence each other; “earlier groups have nothing to gain from the activities or
attitudes of later groups.” Each generation has access to a diversity of temporally
diffuse commodities. Engaging in activity with such goods culminates in modest
present benefits and substantial future cost and that in turn poses the problem of
justice.
A typical example of the PIP is the general (fossil fuel) energy consumption
situation which is characterized by predominantly good immediate effects but
deferred bad effects in terms of the anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions that
cause climate change. Intergenerational justice and climate change have received
increasing attention in recent years (Page 1999; Shue 1999; Gardiner 2001;
Athanasiou and Baer 2002; Shue 2003; Meyer and Roser 2006; Page 2006). The
main rationale behind these discussions is that change in a climate system that
threatens the interest of future generations raises questions concerning justice and
posterity. The same rationale also applies to the production of nuclear power. In the
case of fossil fuel combustion, it is the emitting of greenhouse gasses that can trigger
long-term climatic change for posterity, while with nuclear power deployment, it is
the creation of long-lived radiotoxic waste that could potentially pose safety and
security problems to future generations. In addition to the presence of long-lived
waste, depleting a nonrenewable resource (uranium) in nuclear power production
adds another important intergenerational dimension to the problem.
A further salient feature of this problem is that it could be “perfectly convenient”
for the present generation to “exploit its temporal position” and to visit costs on
future generations (Gardiner 2006, 408). Let me elaborate on what is meant here by
our beneficial temporal position. When discussing future benefits, a typical
economic argument is that future generations will be better off than the present
generation, all of which should justify treating future benefits differently. This
obviously conflicts with the beneficial position of the present generation. What is
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meant by our beneficial position is, however, the plain fact that we live now while
they will live in the future. So we are—temporally speaking—in a position to
influence their interests, while they cannot influence ours in any way whatsoever. In
nuclear power discussions, we can easily pass on the burden of waste to posterity
and that makes us susceptible to “the problem of moral corruption” (Gardiner 2006,
408).1 This provides us with a moral ground for defending obligations to future
generations.
In the remainder of this section, I will explore the way in which we can
contemplate justice to posterity in the case of nuclear power. In so doing, I shall
follow Brian Barry’s (1999) principles concerning the fundamental equality of
human beings when it comes to the matter of addressing intergenerational justice.
Barry expounds his theory by spelling out the normative aspects of the notion of
sustainable development and by commenting that the value of an entity X as we
enjoy it should be sustained into the future so that future generations do not fall
below our level of X. He then presents principles for the theorems of fundamental
equality, two of which are the principle of responsibility—“[a] bad outcome for
which somebody is not responsible provides a prima-facie case for compensation”—
and the principle of vital interests: “location in space and time do not in themselves
affect legitimate claims … [therefore] the vital interests of people in the future have
the same priority as the vital interests of people in the present” (Barry 1999, 97–99).
What is this valuable entity of X that should be distributed equitably over
generations? That is the next question we have to ask ourselves. Barry proposes
opportunity as a metric of justice: a requirement of justice is that “the overall range
of opportunities open to successor generations should not be narrowed. If some
openings are closed off by depletion or rather irreversible damage to the
environment, others should be created (if necessary at the cost of some sacrifice)
to make up” (Barry 1978, 243). So, while adhering to the guiding principle that we
should not narrow the total range of opportunities, I will develop two other
principles that will lead to the matter of how this main principle relates to nuclear
power generation, the main rationale being that whenever we find ourselves in a
position to negatively influence the opportunities open to future generations, we
should be careful not to narrow these opportunities. 2
We should recall the two intergenerational aspects of nuclear power production
and how those could affect posterity’s equal opportunity. The first intergenerational
aspect of nuclear energy-related discussions is the fact that we leave behind
radiotoxic waste with tremendously long lifetime periods. If not properly disposed
1 Stephen Gardiner puts forward this argument in the case of climate change where he addresses three
main related problems which he refers to as three storms. “These three ‘storms’ arise in the global,
intergenerational and theoretical dimensions, and […] their interaction helps to exacerbate and obscure a
lurking problem of moral corruption” (Gardiner 2006: 399). Even though only two of the three “storms”
relate to the problem of nuclear power production and the accompanying waste (i.e., theoretical and
intergenerational), I believe that the main rationale of this argument, which is based on our advantageous
temporal position to impose harm on future generations, is not undermined.
2 Other scholars too, such as Arneson (1989), have also defended equality of opportunity as a metrics for
justice. Objections could however be made to this currency of justice; see for instance Page’s discussion
(Page 2006, 54–59) for an overview of the literature available on this ongoing issue. Again, other scholars
propose other currencies, for instance capability (Sen 1982). It would be beyond the scope of this work to
enter into such discussions here.
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of, this waste can influence the safety and security of future generations and
therefore also their vital interests. So, the first intergenerational duty I will discuss is
one that relates to the safety and security of future generations or to their vital
interests. The second intergenerational aspect of nuclear power generation is the fact
that by depleting a non-replaceable resource (uranium), we are giving future
generations less access to it. If we assume that well-being significantly relies on the
availability of energy resources, we are in a position to influence future opportunity
for well-being. From the latter, I conclude that we have a moral obligation to ensure
the future’s opportunity for well-being—or to sustain future well-being—insofar as it
can be achieved by the availability of such energy resources.
To sum up, there are at least two obligations concerning the present generation
that emanate from the intergenerational aspects of nuclear power production. Firstly,
there is the duty not to jeopardize the safety and security of those living in the future
or to violate their vital interests. Secondly, there is the duty to sustain future well-
being, assuming that the availability of resources is able to guarantee that.3 The next
section provides a detailed discussion on these two duties. It further unfolds the
notion of prima facie duties before then going on to present the two temporal duties
cited as prima facie duties. In Section 3, I shall examine the extent of the moral
stringency of these duties in cases of internal conflict when it becomes impossible to
comply with both duties at the same time.
2 Moral Pluralism and Temporal Prima Facie Duties
Pluralists believe that morality cannot be captured in one single principle or value in
the way that that is done with monist views such as utilitarianism. Situations in
which a plurality of morally relevant features should be taken into consideration are
conceivable; the question of how to act then depends on which of these moral
features is more compelling, and that in turn depends upon the situation context. In
order to facilitate this distinction, William David Ross (1930/2002, 19–21) presents
“prima facie duties” as duties that one has moral reason to follow in a certain
situation. Such duties hold as long as they are not overridden by any more morally
compelling duties. Our actual duty (or “duty proper” as Ross terms it) is then an all-
things-considered duty in which moral conflicts have been properly addressed. Ross
(1930/2002, 20) distinguishes between seven basic prima facie duties, including the
duties of justice, beneficence, and non-maleficence.
“The phrase ‘prima facie duty’ must be apologized for,” Ross states, as it
“suggests that one is speaking only of an appearance which a moral situation
presents at first sight, and which may turn out to be illusory” (Ross 1930/2002, 20).
3 In this paper, I am following a duty-based approach to intergenerational justice. A related question is
whether these duties should be grounded in corresponding rights of future generations. In this paper, I take
the liberty of not discussing this issue in detail; I just want to make two remarks. Firstly, I believe that the
fact that future interest is susceptible to our action is enough reason to defend moral obligations towards
them, without any reference to future rights. Secondly, even though “equal rights” is one of the main
principles of fundamental equality, together with Barry, I think that this principle does not have any direct
intergenerational application (Barry 1999). For more information on the issue of the rights of future
generations, please consult (Gosseries 2008a).
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Nevertheless, Ross sticks to this notion as he believes that there is no better
alternative. The phrase prima facie duty serves to highlight the fact that such duties
might sometimes be overridden by more morally compelling duties. The latter does
not, however, downplay their moral relevance: “these prima facie duties are features
that give us genuine (not merely apparent) moral reasons to do certain actions.” 4
The distinction between prima facie duty and actual duty is “best interpreted as
being a distinction between a duty-imposing reason and a duty” (Wellman 1995,
249). In my interpretation of prima facie duties, I also emphasize that there are
genuine grounds for duties (or legitimate duty-imposing reasons) but that says
nothing about their moral stringency; this issue will be elaborated on in the next
section.
Like moral pluralists, I consider it unfeasible to capture all morally relevant
features in one single principle or value. I furthermore consider Ross's notion of our
prima facie duty to relate to our temporal relationship with our descendants before
then going on to formulate the specific duties that emanate from this relationship.5
The two duties presented in this paper do, to some extent, resemble certain basic
Rossian duties. For instance, handing down resources to future generations could be
a derivative of Ross's duty of justice or beneficence while not jeopardizing future
people's vital interest can be subsumed under his duty of non-maleficence. However,
unlike Ross (1930/2002, 29–30) who asserts that the basic (or fundamental) prima
facie duties should be taken for granted as “mathematical axioms” or seen as “part of
the fundamental nature of the universe,” I derive these duties from the
intergenerational nature of nuclear power production and consumption.
2.1 The Prima Facie Duty Not to Harm Future People
Following Barry's principle of vital interest to the effect that “the vital interests of
people in the future have the same priority as the vital interests of people in the
present” (Barry 1999, 97–99), I present the obligation not to negatively influence the
vital interests of future generations by safeguarding their safety and security. This
can alternatively be termed the obligation “not to harm” posterity. There is
something that has to be said about the origins and the applications of this principle.
One of the fundamental ethical obligations underscoring all human interaction is that
of avoiding harm to others. In social interaction between people, for instance, it has
been argued that an individual is sovereign as long as he is not harming another
individual (Mill 1859/1998: 14). This no harm principle is also a leading creed for
health care professionals; the related maxim that is frequently invoked in health care
is thus: “to do no harm above all else” (Beauchamp and Childress 2009: Ch. 5). In
environmental policy making, too, this principle is becoming increasingly
influential, for instance, where it inspires the Precautionary Principle: namely
“[w]hen an activity raises threats of harm to the environment or human health,
4 The quote is from the introduction of a later reprint of the book “The Right and the Good” written by
Phillip Stratton-Lake (Ross 1930/2002, xxxiv).
5 Shrader-Frechette (1994, 1991) also refers to temporal prima facie duties in “Risk and Rationality” and
later in “Equity and Nuclear Waste Disposal.” However, it seems that this is an allusion to the literal or
common sense meaning of this phrase (indicating at first sight or apparent) rather than to the Rossian
interpretation of this notion.
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precautionary measures should be taken even if some cause and effect relationships
are not fully established scientifically”, as stipulated in the Wingspread Statement.6
What is particularly interesting about the precautionary principle is that it shifts
the burden of proof; so, we should refrain from an activity (e.g., developing or
applying a technology) unless there is enough evidence that it will not cause severe
harm (Jonas 1984). Critics argue that this principle sets the bar so high that it could
hamper technological innovation, but the question of where to set the bar is a matter
of how to interpret the precautionary principle in the face of uncertainty. The
precautionary principle has, above all else, “a purposeful role in guiding future
political and regulatory action” (O’Riordan and Cameron 1994, 16). The no harm
duty as advocated here resembles the precautionary principle in that it urges us to
refrain from action whenever our actions might result in harm being inflicted upon
future generations. So, in this interpretation, we would not guarantee future
generations’ “equal opportunity”; rather, we should refrain from action if such
action could endanger posterity’s “equal opportunity.”
Before turning to discussing the moral stringency of the presented duties, let me
first address two relevant questions with respect to this “no harm principle”: i.e., (1)
what exactly constitutes harm? and (2) how does this account of harm relate to
Barry’s vital interest? In the relevant literature, there is a general consensus that
present generations should not harm future generations, and if it is unequivocally
evident that an activity will harm future generations, then the ethical assertion that
we should refrain from such an activity is rather simple and straightforward.7 In the
case of nuclear waste, however, it is not about imposing direct harm, it is rather
about the risk of harming people in the future. Indeed, it is inherently included in the
definition of risk (as undesired effect times probability) that we can never completely
exclude it, which is why I present this temporal no harm duty notion as a prima facie
duty rather than an absolute duty. My notion of the temporal no harm duty should be
read as a duty-imposing reason that urges us to decrease the possibility of causing
harm to future generations.
The second question is about the relationship between Barry's vital interest
principle and the one that I am defending here. Barry (1999, 105) argues that taking
equal opportunity seriously means that “the condition must be such as to sustain a
range of possible conceptions of the good life”; such a good life will in any case
include “adequate nutrition, clean drinking-water, clothing and housing, health care
and education.” Here, my understanding of vital interest is in a very specific sense. I
argued earlier in this paper that whenever we are in a position to negatively influence
future opportunities, we should be careful not to narrow these opportunities. One
6 This refers to an influential definition of the precautionary principle, presented by the Science and
Environmental Health Network (1998).
7 There are several objections that could be made to the notion of not harming future generation, the most
well-known one being Derek Parfit's “non-identity” problem, to the effect that we cannot be said to harm
future generations whose contingent identities rely on the actions and choices of contemporary people
(Parfit 1984, Ch. 16). Here, I take the liberty of not discussing this or other general objections to the notion
of obligations to future generations such as whether we should discount future well-being and future
health impacts. For a detailed discussion of these objections, see (Taebi 2010, Sec. 1.3.). In this paper, I
am merely stating that the creation of the intergenerational problem by the present generation (in the wake
of nuclear power generation and consumption) gives rise to certain prima facie duties to future
generations, the extent of which will be further examined here.
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clear way in which we can negatively affect future interest is by inappropriately
disposing of nuclear waste. In my “no harm” account, what is considered to be of
vital interest relates to the issues of safety and security. That is where the potential
endangering lies if nuclear waste is inappropriately disposed of.
To summarize, moral agents have a prima facie duty not to inflict upon future
generations the risk of harm if such risk could possibly culminate in violating the
vital interests of future generations and could thereby endanger their equal
opportunity. As far as the nuclear discussion is concerned, there is a general
consensus that we should not impose “undue burdens” on future generations (IAEA
1995). Many nations agree that this undue burden clause should be taken to mean
that nuclear waste should be disposed of in geological repositories which are
believed to guarantee the long-term safety of future generations (NEA-OECD 1995).
I will defer further discussion on this issue to Section 5.
2.2 The Prima Facie Duty to Sustain Future Well-Being
The second obligation relates to the appropriate consumption of nonreplicable
resources or to what is known as intergenerational resourcism. Brian Barry (1989a:
515) states that “[f]rom a temporal perspective, no one generation has a better or
worse claim than any other to enjoy the earth’s resources.” It would, however, be
irrational to expect the present generation to leave all nonrenewable resources to its
successors. For one thing, such restriction would seriously affect current well-being,
which would inevitably affect future well-being as well. Another thing is that such a
ban would not only include the present generations but also future generations and
would therefore be beneficial to no one (Gosseries 2001, 344). As replicating such
resources is not an option either, Barry (1989a, 519) argues that we need to offer
compensation or recompense for depleted resources “in the sense that later
generations should be no worse off […] than they would have been without
depletion.” In this paper, I adopt Barry’s reasoning regarding the adequate
consumption of nonrenewable resources: “[t]he minimal claim of equal opportunity
is an equal claim on the earth’s natural resources” (Barry 1989b, 490). If we assume
that welfare and well-being8 rely heavily on the availability of energy resources—a
claim that could be historically underpinned by considering developments from the
time of the industrial revolution until the present day—I would argue that we should
compensate for a reduction in the opportunities for well-being as they can be brought
about by energy resources.
The question that then arises is that of why we should leave the same amount of
goods (or resources) for our descendants. Wilfred Beckerman (1999, 73) argues that
taking the present levels of well-being as a point of comparison is arbitrary and has
no normative significance when it comes to supporting intergenerational duty; “past
generations seem to have survived with far less.” Barry (1999: 106), on the other
hand, states that “unless people in the future can be held responsible for the situation
that they find themselves in, they should not be worse off than we are.” To elaborate
8 My interpretation of welfare is not necessarily or exclusively a monetary one, and to a great extent, it
overlaps the interpretation linked to well-being. In this paper, I do not therefore distinguish between these
two notions.
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on Barry's reasoning, I would argue that we, the present generation, have a prima
facie duty to compensate future generations for the nonrenewable resources we have
depleted (uranium). In this paper, I am not focusing on the question of how much we
should compensate; my claim is merely that future generations should at least have
access to equivalent resources that we have had access to and which necessitate
some kind of compensation.9 In Section 4, I will explore the technological
possibilities of offering compensation within the boundaries of the nuclear option.
3 The Moral Stringency of Temporal Duties: Internal Conflict
So far, two temporal duties have been formulated for the present generation in terms
of prima facie duties, with the caveat that in possible conflicting situations, they
could be overridden by more compelling duties. To comply with these duties, we
need to implement certain technologies; two types of conflict could occur. In the first
place, there could be internal conflict in situations where a certain technology does
not allow us to accomplish both duties simultaneously; which duty should then be
given priority? The second type of conflict that might occur is intergenerational
conflict; the application of new technologies could shift the burden and benefit
balance for present and future generations. Situations would then become thinkable
in which we would need to impose more burdens on present generations in order to
honor our duties to posterity, all of which raise the question of whether our temporal
prima facie duties could be viewed as decisive when they conflict with the other
duties we have to present generations. This section only explores internal conflicts;
the discussion relating to intergenerational conflict is deferred to Section 5.
Internal conflict occurs when we cannot comply with both duties simultaneously.
The question which then follows is: are we more duty-bound to consider other
people's well-being or do we have a greater duty not to harm them or to at least
decrease the likelihood of harm? In more philosophical terms, one can question
whether the positive duty to secure benefits for posterity is in principle more morally
compelling than the negative duty not to harm posterity. This has, in fact, given rise
to a long-lasting debate among contemporary philosophers. In proposing his
fundamental prima facie duties, David Ross (1930/2002, 21) distinguished between
the two duties of beneficence and non-maleficence, even though he admits that “to
injure others is incidentally to fail to do them good.” He makes this distinction
because he ascribes more stringent stipulations to the duty of non-maleficence than
9 Barry (1989a) introduces the notion of “productive potential,” arguing that depletion makes future
generations worse off in terms of the productive potential that needs to be compensated. My notion of
compensation as presented here is a rather simpler one, namely, that we should guarantee that future
generations have access to equivalent resources. This notion poses several philosophical challenges,
including how to determine what constitutes “equivalent” when we deplete one resource and seek to
substitute it with another. We furthermore need to assume that we can “substitute critical natural resources
with human-made resources” (Skagen Ekeli 2004, 434). At a more fundamental level, we need to assume
that the substitutability of natural capital with man-made and physical capital is a fact (Pearce et al. 1989,
40–43). This assumption has many implications, such as the fact that man-made capital is, by definition,
less diverse. This assumption also raises certain questions such as that of whether exhaustible energy
resources should be compensated by technological progress or with renewable resources (Pearce and
Turner 1990). More will be said about this issue in Section 3.
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to beneficence. John Rawls furthermore emphasizes that negative duties that require
us not to cause harm carry more weight when compared with the positive duty to do
something good for others (Rawls 1971, 98).10
The scholars Martin Golding and Daniel Callahan added a temporal dimension to
this discussion. While Golding (1981, 62) conceives of a temporal duty by stating
that we should produce and promote “conditions of good living for future
generations,” Callahan (1981, 78) emphasizes the duty “to refrain from doing things
which might be harmful to future generations.” These two positions differ mainly in
the way that they relate to future generations; Golding defends a positive duty to
benefit close future generations, while Callahan’s negative duty extends much
further into the future to contemplate the possibility of harm caused to remote future
generations. The political philosopher Avner de-Shalit (1995, 13) merges these two
positions; he emphasizes that contemporaries have a strong positive obligation to
close and immediate future generations to “supply them with goods, especially those
goods that we believe […] will be necessary to cope with the challenges of life”, but
he also advocates less strong negative duties towards the distant future.11
We could distinguish between our two duties in terms of the types of goods
protected by claiming that the no harm duty has to do with protecting the vital
interests linked to the safety and security issues that exposure to radiation will bring.
Similarly, the duty to sustain well-being relates to energy resources in the form of
goods that could be used to safeguard well-being; we might therefore call them non-
vital interests. If we accept this distinction, then the conclusion that in an internal
conflict situation the no harm duty has a stronger moral appeal would seem
straightforward enough. We have more compelling moral reasons to protect vital
rather than non-vital interests. Let us now evaluate whether the distinction presented
between the two duties is as clear-cut as has been indicated here; any overlap or
interdependency might affect their moral stringency. One can, for instance, argue
that if future generations are to enjoy their equal opportunity for well-being, their
health and safety first need to be guaranteed. In other words, in order to be able to
enjoy the fruits of the resources at their disposal, future generations must first be
protected against ionizing radiations (one assumes that also in the future, being
exposed to ionizing radiation will lead to serious health problems).12 It is indeed true
that the no harm duty is a fundamental prerequisite attached to the duty to sustain
welfare, but the scope of the no harm duty is much broader. Endangering the safety
and health of people of the future would be wrong, regardless of the duty to sustain
well-being. What is so innately morally wrong is the fact that future people whose
safety and security are conceivably compromised by exposure to radiation would
never be able to enjoy “equal opportunity.” Hence, the distinction in terms of the
types of good these duties protect will still apply.
Conversely, we can argue that not complying with the duty of sustaining well-
being could be viewed as harmful. In other words, without a safe and affordable
energy supply, many basic needs such as medical care will inevitably be
10 Beauchamp and Childress (2009, Ch. 4) also discuss the distinction between the notions of beneficence
and non-maleficence.
11 De-Shalit defends a “communitarian” approach to intergenerational justice; see (De-Shalit 1995).
12 I owe these suggestions to an anonymous reviewer.
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compromised, all of which could then harm future generations. It is indeed true that
well-being inherently entails certain health issues. However, even when we accept
that “sustaining well-being” involves the negative duty of “not imposing harm” by
virtue of the positive duty of safeguarding energy resources, this does not affect the
moral decisiveness of the two duties in relation to each other. Another important
distinction we should make between the two duties pertains to the time periods (and
thus to the number of generations) to which they relate. The duty to sustain well-
being has been presented as a positive duty relating to the time span during which
we could affect the lives of close future generations by influencing the availability of
energy resources. However, our knowledge about future energy provision is very
limited. Let me illustrate this with an example. There are now 440 nuclear power
reactors operational worldwide, and an estimation made in 2010 forecasts that in due
course, some 500 new reactors will be built (WNA 2010). These estimations that
stem from before the Fukushima accident could turn out to be unreliable, but let us
assume—for the sake of argument—that such predictions will be borne out. Even
then, our ability to positively affect the well-being of people on the basis of the
availability of the necessary energy resources will hardly extend to a hundred
years.13 Beyond that period, it is very difficult or, more to the point, virtually
impossible to foresee what the energy landscape will look like, let alone to positively
affect it. On the other hand, the “no harm duty” as presented here will have a time
span of thousands of years, the duration for which nuclear waste is radiotoxic and
potentially harmful. Hence, if we cannot comply with both duties simultaneously,
the no harm duty will become morally more compelling because of the type of goods
it is protecting and because of the time span and the number of generations it
involves.
Another important issue when assessing the moral stringency of the two duties in
relation to each other is the fact that the duty of sustaining well-being and the
ensuing notion of compensation rest on the serious assumption that nuclear power
deployment will continue. While one can argue that depleting nonrenewable
resources creates the obligation to compensate future generations, further justifica-
tion is needed to demonstrate that such compensation lies within the boundaries of
the nuclear option. One can argue that the availability of other suitable energy
resources should counteract the depletion of uranium as a nonrenewable resource
and that solar and wind energy should, for instance, be promoted (Pearce and Turner
1990). Nevertheless, the focus of this paper is upon the boundaries of nuclear
technology. There are certain features of nuclear technology that are alien to other
nonrenewable resources (such as fossil fuel) and so that could, to some extent,
justify exploring the possibility of compensation within the confines of this
technology. One possible way of compensating is, for instance, by making energy
production methods more efficient and that, too, would contribute to making the
remaining stock of nonrenewable resources go further (Barry 1989a, 519–520).
Unlike oil, gas, or coal, we can deploy nuclear fuel substantially more efficiently by
recycling and reusing the waste. Furthermore, there are nuclear production methods
13 Here, I am assuming that it will take several decades to build these reactors and that they will remain
operational for several decades
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that produce more fuel than they consume; more will be said about such options in
the next section.
One important aspect of this type of compensation relates to the available
reserves of natural uranium. The availability of uranium is usually taken to
refer to its geological certainty and to production costs. According to recent
estimations, there will be at least enough reasonably priced uranium available
for approximately 100 years when using only existing conventional reactors. If
we include estimations of all the available resources (i.e., phosphate deposits
and seawater (SER 2008)), the period of uranium availability will extend to
thousands of years (IAEA-NEA 2008). A related issue that could also justify
compensation within the boundaries of nuclear technology involves looking to
the alternative, to thorium, that is naturally more abundant than uranium. From
the very early days of nuclear fission deployment, thorium has been seen as a
serious alternative (Kazimi 2003). Indeed, starting up thorium fuel cycles has
certain negative implications, a key one of which is that during production, a
ready-made material will be produced that is deployable for the manufacture of
nuclear bombs (WNA 2008).
In conclusion, if we assume that nuclear power production will continue, we
can say that the technologies that should then be preferred should be those that
keep more resource options open to future generations. Whether future
generations will ultimately deploy the available nuclear resources is something
that we cannot and perhaps should not even want to decide for them; we merely
provide them with the opportunity to do so.14 There is, however, no doubt that
long-term compensation in terms of extending nuclear fuel is sound if, and only if,
we assume that nuclear fission (i.e., the current nuclear power production method)
will continue for a long period of time. The latter downgrades the moral
importance of this notion of compensation within the boundaries of nuclear
technology as defended here, especially when the two duties cannot be complied
with simultaneously.
To recapitulate, the argument given in this section is that—all things being
equal—the prima facie duty not to impose harm on future generations is more
morally compelling than the duty to sustain well-being by regulating energy
resources. This should not, however, be interpreted in absolute terms because
the ranking of moral relevance (or the determining of the actual duty as Ross
terms it) requires us to consider all prima facie duties and address their
potential conflicts. Imagine, for instance, a situation in which the harm is
relatively minor compared to the possible benefits; we can conveniently argue
that the obligation of beneficence would then take precedence over that of non-
maleficence.15
14 A related question is that of whether we can guarantee that future generations will acquire the same
level of well-being from these resources. Like Barry, I argue that the latter will fall beyond the scope of the
principle of responsibility. “What is important from the point of view of justice is the range of choices
open to [future generations], rather than what they get out of it” (Barry 1983, 20).
15 Such situations are, for instance, conceivable in biomedical ethics; see (Beauchamp and Childress 2009,
Ch. 5).
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4 Nuclear Energy: A Review of the Technology and Its Future
Technology plays a crucial role in establishing how to comply with these duties.
With nuclear power production, compensation for the depleting reserves of uranium
could be provided in different ways. First of all, minor adjustments can be made to
make the existing production methods more efficient or to extract more uranium
from other natural resources such as see water (SER 2008). The focus in this paper
is, however, on the entire fuel cycle. In the following paragraphs, I will discuss two
existing and two future fuel cycles, and I shall evaluate how they score from the
point of view of complying with our temporal prima facie duties.
Any nuclear fuel cycle consists of several major steps, including the mining and
milling of uranium ore, its enrichment, fuel fabrication, irradiation in a reactor, and
the optional waste treatment methods employed after irradiation and before the final
disposal of the waste. Uranium is currently deployed in most operational energy
reactors, which are commonly referred to as light water reactors (LWR). Naturally
occurring uranium contains different constituents (isotopes) in the form of the minor
fissile isotope that is capable of producing energy in existing reactors but is present
in less than 1% of natural uranium and the major isotope (>99%) that is not fissile
and therefore not deployable in existing operational reactors. In the following
paragraphs, I shall distinguish between the two existing fuel cycles (open and
closed) while simultaneously presenting two future fuel cycles that will help us to
comply better with the presented prima facie duties towards future generations.16
(1) The Open Fuel Cycle: In an open or once-through fuel cycle (of the type
common in the US and certain other countries like Sweden), enriched uranium
is irradiated once. The material remaining after irradiation is known as spent
fuel and contains not yet irradiated uranium and plutonium together with other
radionuclides, all of which have to be disposed of as waste. The waste in an
open fuel cycle should ideally be isolated from the biosphere for about
200,000 years; this period is referred to as the waste lifetime.
(2) The Closed Fuel Cycle: An alternative option is to reprocess (recycle) spent
fuel so that deployable materials (uranium and plutonium) are extracted in
order to afterwards be reused as fuel; the reinserting of these materials closes
the cycle, which is why this method is dubbed the closed fuel cycle method.
The waste lifetime of the remaining waste is about 10,000 years. Closed fuel
cycles are common in many European countries, but certain other countries,
like Japan, that have access to fewer natural resources primarily see it as a way
of extending their energy resources. Reprocessing and reusing deployable
material considerably increase the long-term availability of uranium (IAEA-
NEA 2008). The closed fuel cycle scores better in the fulfilling of both duties
as it decreases the waste lifetime while increasing the availability of resources.
In the first three rows of Table 1, an internal comparison of these two fuel
cycles is presented; the plus signs in the closed fuel cycle column indicate its
better score in terms of fulfilling the stated duties when compared to the open
16 This is maybe not the right place to elaborate on these fuel cycles at length. For a profound and
technically detailed discussion of these fuel cycles, the reader is referred to the following pages (Taebi and
Kloosterman 2008, 181–184) and (Taebi and Kadak 2010, 1347–1352).
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fuel cycle. The next two fuel cycles are proposed to explore how far we could
go—technologically speaking—in fulfilling these duties. These fuel cycles are
scientifically proven, but years of development and industrialization will be
required before they can be made operational.
(3) Partitioning and Transmutation: In addition to reprocessing, a further
deactivating of the remaining waste can be achieved by means of a new
method known as Partitioning and Transmutation (P&T). This involves
separating and dividing (partitioning) the materials remaining after reprocess-
ing so that they can afterwards be eliminated (transmuted) in Fast Reactors;17
these reactors can irradiate the radionuclides that the currently operational
LWR cannot irradiate. This can substantially reduce the waste lifetime to
several hundred years (NRC 1996). It is thus a fuel cycle that scores relatively
better on the no harm duty scoreboard, as is indicated in Table 1.
(4) The Breeder Fuel Cycle: Fast reactors could also be deployed in the
configuration of a nuclear breeder for the purposes of making (or breeding)
more fuel than is consumed during operation. The best feasible option is to
irradiate the abundant uranium isotope (which cannot be irradiated in a LWR)
and breed a certain plutonium isotope, which can be extracted by reprocessing,
before then reusing it as fuel. In this way, uranium consumption will become
substantially more efficient; the two plus signs given in Table 1 indicate that
fulfilling the second duty is what is best for this particular fuel cycle. This fuel
cycle is designed to enhance the resource durability, and the remaining waste
contains very long-lived radionuclides; therefore, it does not score well on the
no harm duty.
As can be seen, different fuel cycles are capable of complying with the temporal
duties in different ways. I would again like to emphasize that the plus and minus
signs in Table 1 merely signify relative comparisons between these four fuel cycles.
Before assessing the desirability of these technologies from the point of view of
safeguarding the interests of future generations, we should also remind ourselves of
how they shift the burdens and benefits for contemporaries.
17 It is important to note that there are currently only a few fast reactors in use. Before this fuel cycle can
become an industrial reality, a considerable number of additional reactors must first be built. See for more
information (Taebi and Kadak 2010, Sec. 4.3.).
Table 1 Four fuel cycles and their relative scores with respect to temporal duties
Not to impose harm To sustain well-being
Open fuel cycle − −
Closed fuel cycle + +
Partitioning and transmutation ++ +
The breeder fuel cycle − ++
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5 Intergenerational Conflicts and Three Challenges
So far, I have argued that we have two temporal duties with regard to posterity.
These duties are presented as prima facie duties in an effort to address any possible
conflict existing between these duties. In Section 3, an internal conflict was
discussed. We concluded that in an all-things-being-equal situation, the no harm duty
should take precedence over the duty to sustain future well-being. If we now take the
no harm duty as the leading notion when choosing a fuel cycle, then maximally
reducing the long-term concerns for future generations through P&T would seem to
be the most desirable option, as can also be seen in Table 1. Let us dwell for a
moment on how the implementation of this fuel cycle affects the interest of
contemporaries.
As stated in Section 4, the P&T fuel cycle should be viewed as a complementary
strategy to the existing closed fuel cycle. In other words, before the successful
reprocessing and extraction of uranium and plutonium from spent fuel take place, it
is impossible to continue eliminating the remaining radionuclides through P&T. So,
let us first explore how reprocessing shifts the burdens and benefits for the present
generation before then continuing with the matter of P&T.
Reprocessing is a chemical process employed for the separation of uranium and
plutonium; it is a process that creates considerable safety, security, and economic
burdens for the present generation. To be precise, it necessitates more nuclear
activity than usual, and the chemical radiotoxic residual of reprocessing subse-
quently has to be disposed of as well.18 In nuclear technology, one distinguishes
between safety and security in order to emphasize the distinction between
unintentional and intentional harm. In this case, safety is connected with the
unintentional release of radiotoxic material that can subsequently lead to health
problems. Security, on the other hand, refers to the intentional releasing of
radioactive substances; both as a result of sabotage and in the form of proliferation
pertaining to the manufacturing and disseminating of nuclear weapons (IAEA 2007).
Reprocessing creates additional proliferation risk for contemporaries if one considers
that plutonium separated during reprocessing could also be used for destructive
purposes. Indeed, such separating is primarily undertaken for civil purposes (to
produce nuclear fuel and to reinsert it in the cycle), but security concerns will
certainly mount during this process and will remain until the separated plutonium is
again deployed in a nuclear reactor.19 Furthermore, since reprocessing plants are
quite expensive, only a few countries have them at their disposal. In Europe, where a
majority of the countries tend to favor the closed fuel cycle approach, there are
currently two operational reprocessing plants located in Great Britain and in France.
One could illustrate the additional burdens for contemporaries by contemplating
the general situation and the recent accident in Japan. As a country with no
substantial energy resources of its own, Japan is particularly keen to make efficient
18 Together with Jan Leen Kloosterman, I have discussed these arguments at some length elsewhere (Taebi
and Kloosterman, 2008).
19 Strictly speaking, the separated plutonium from a nuclear reactor is not weapon-grade or equivalent to
the type of material that is usually used to manufacture nuclear weapons. This plutonium does, however,
have some serious destructive capacities; for a detailed technical discussion on this matter, see (Taebi
Forthcoming).
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use of the resources it has at its disposal. It is therefore understandable that Japan has
opted for closed fuel cycles and reprocessing so that the spent fuel can be reused.
Since the country does not yet have a reprocessing plant of its own, Japanese waste
is reprocessed in France and in the UK; Japan is currently building its own
reprocessing plant. Apart from the additional safety and security burdens brought by
transporting spent fuel and reprocessed waste back and forth, using separated
plutonium as a fuel creates additional risks too. Since the nuclear accident in
Fukushima Daiichi, Reactor 3 has been giving serious cause for concern. It is the
presence of plutonium as a mixed oxide fuel (MOX) in this reactor’s fuel that is
giving rise to such grave concerns; MOX is a mixture of uranium and reprocessed
plutonium. Since, if inhaled, plutonium is extremely toxic, its potential release into
the environment is reason enough for serious concern (Cooper et al. 2003, 113).
The next important issue is that P&T is merely a technology that has been
scientifically proven at lab level. It still requires decades of development which, in
turn, will necessitate serious investments in this technology (NEA-OECD 2002). On
top of the burdens of reprocessing, these other burdens also have to be borne by
contemporaries or at least by those nations that are capable of developing the
technology.20 To conclude, the burdens of developing and eventually deploying P&T
will mainly be borne by the present and immediately following generation, while it
is primarily designed to reduce safety burdens for remote future generations.21
At least three objections could be made to the idea of accepting additional
burdens for contemporaries in order to reduce the likelihood of causing harm to
remote future generations. The first has to do with the long-term safety that
geological repositories supposedly guarantee so that there is no need to further
deactivate the waste. A second rejoinder to this view is the contention that placing
additional safety and security burdens upon contemporaries is highly undesirable
and therefore unjustified. The last objection relates to the distribution of these
additional burdens between contemporaries.
5.1 Repositories Guarantee Long-Term Safety; Why Should We Accept More
Current Burdens?
Some people argue that current technology is perfectly capable of handling the waste
problem. We should avoid “undue burdens” on future generations (IAEA 2009), and
that can best be achieved—so the argument goes—in deep geological repositories.
As a matter of fact, this solution enjoys broad consensus among nuclear energy-
producing countries. The Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA-OECD 1999, 11) articulates
this consensus as follows: “Potential host geologic formations are chosen for their
long-term stability, their ability to accommodate the waste disposal facility, and also
their ability to prevent or severely attenuate any eventual release of radioactivity.
This natural safety barrier is complemented and augmented by an engineered system
20 Due to the inherent technological implications and complexity, not all countries will be capable of
developing or deploying this technology; see (IAEA 2004).
21 The intergenerational distribution of the burdens and benefits of different fuel cycles is more precisely
and extensively discussed in a joint paper written with Andrew Kadak. We have mapped out the
consequences of four possible fuel cycles in terms of the moral values at stake. Both Partitioning and
Transmutation and the Breeder Fuel Cycle are discussed there (Taebi and Kadak 2010).
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designed to provide primary physical and chemical containment of the waste.”Many
countries are currently taking the first steps towards realizing such repositories; some
countries such as Finland, France, Sweden, Spain, and the United Kingdom have
already set up operational repositories for less radiotoxic types of waste, for
intermediate-level and low-level wastes (NEA-OECD 1996). Some countries like
Finland have already chosen their repository sites for high-level waste, and Sweden
has narrowed down its attention to two possible sites (Rogers 2009).
In view of these considerations, it seems unjustifiable to impose more risks on the
present generation simply in order to reduce the waste lifetime. However, one of the
problems with long-term waste disposal is the inherent uncertainty both in terms of
technical predictions and regarding future societies. There is enough historical
evidence to underpin the notion that we are hardly in a position to anticipate human
behavior and the status of future societies a few hundred years from now, let alone
10,000 or 100,000 years on. The question that naturally follows from this is whether
this should have a bearing on our moral responsibility towards future generations.
Kristian Skagen Ekeli argues that our ignorance with respect to future generations
“reduces our responsibility in a temporal dimension because in most areas it is
impossible to foresee the interests and resource needs of future generations” (Skagen
Ekeli 2004, 442); this corresponds to the way in which Martin Golding (1981, 70)
views our duties to future generation as he argues “the more distant the generation
we focus upon, the less likely it is that we have an obligation to promote its good.”
Skagen Ekeli (2004, 442) argues, on the other hand, that there are things that we
could be certain about such as the physiological needs of future people and that it is
therefore immoral to impose risks upon future generations that threaten these
physiological needs when risk assessment is presented that is “supported by
scientifically based harm scenarios.” Even though Skagen Ekeli acknowledges the
difficulties that arise from scientific disagreement about harm scenarios, he does not
consider this to be an insurmountable problem. Unlike Skagen Ekeli, I argue that in
addressing the acceptability of a certain technology with long-term consequences, all
the uncertainties and the ensuing problem of disagreement on predictions do pose
intractable challenges. This is particularly the case in the foreseeing of the long-term
consequences of geological repositories.
A second relevant aspect is how to deal with possible uncertainties regarding the
technical predictions for the remote future in policy making. Let me illustrate this by
giving the example of how such uncertainty was anticipated in the case of the Yucca
Mountain's repositories once allocated for the permanent disposal of American spent
fuel for a million years. The Yucca Mountain site in the State of Nevada was
proposed some decades ago, but it met with strong public resistance. During the
most recent presidential election, Barak Obama promised Nevadans that he would
stop further development of this site if he were elected, and it was a promise that he
kept. Even though the Yucca Mountain's repository idea has officially been
abandoned, it is worth considering how its radiation protection standards for long-
term protection have been set.
At the same time as acknowledging the difficulties surrounding the long-term
uncertainties of technical systems, it has been proposed that we should distinguish
between different future people: “a repository must provide reasonable protection
and security for the very far future, but this may not necessarily be at levels deemed
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protective (and controllable) for the current or succeeding generations” (EPA 2005,
49036). People living in the next 10,000 years deserve a level of protection equal to
the current level, and the generations belonging to the period extending beyond
10,000 years could be exposed to a much higher radiation limit. The underlying
argument for this distinction is sought in the low degree of predictability for the
remote future and the fact that any positive influence on such societies is
meaningless, all of which is believed to diminish our responsibility towards future
generations.22
We could now ask whether this also releases us from the duty of not imposing
possible harm on future generations. An ensuing question might be to ask whether
the present generation has a duty to reduce the waste lifetime to more conceivable
time periods in order to avoid ending up in a situation in which—from a pragmatic
point of view—we need to discriminate against remote future generations which, in
turn, increases the possibility of harming people living in the remote future.
Elsewhere, I argue that the distinction between future generations lacks solid moral
justification, concluding that in the light of long-term uncertainties, we should
reconsider whether geological repositories really are the best option for final waste
disposal (Taebi Forthcoming).
5.2 Should We Impose More Safety and Security Burdens on Contemporaries?
The next objection I discuss relates to the justifiability of additional burdens for
contemporaries. As argued above, developing and deploying P&T to reduce any
future burdens linked to nuclear waste bring with it serious additional economic,
safety, and security burdens for the present generation. In this paper, I will leave the
issue of whether it is justifiable for this generation to bear the economic burdens
unanalyzed. Instead, I will focus on the morally more important question of whether
the additional safety and security risks are justified. Let us just remind ourselves that
more nuclear activities are involved in P&T and that during reprocessing, separated
plutonium (in an initial step towards P&T) involves high proliferation risks. If it is
indeed true that a nuclear accident or nuclear warfare could have consequences that
would be suffered far beyond the present generation, some people—such as Axel
Gosseries (2008b)—argue that we should avoid risks of malevolent use, particularly
from the intergenerational justice point of view, by defending geological disposal as
the fastest and best feasible option for the disposal of waste in the near future.
It is widely accepted that since the present generation has created the waste, it
should also—as far as possible—bear the responsibility of managing it (NEA-OECD
1995, 9). Quite how the latter point should be interpreted is, however, open to
debate. Some argue that since the benefits of nuclear power are mainly enjoyed by
the present generation, they should also be the ones to bear the burdens. A general
consensus in nuclear waste management is the principle of equality between
generations, meaning that similar levels of protection for people living now and in
the future should be guaranteed (NEA-OECD 1984); geological repositories are
22 The notion of diminishing responsibility over the course of time— as referred to here—is defended by
the Swedish KASAM (2005, Ch. 9) and the American National Academy of Public Administration
(NAPA 1997).
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believed to best comply with this principle. However, as emerged from the American
example, designing such an underground disposal repository amounts to a violation
of the equality principle.
I would even go one step further by arguing that the rationale of the equal
treatment argument is faulty. The equal treatment principle presupposes that there is
an equal temporal distribution of benefits that should justify an equal distribution of
the burdens. A utilitarian would argue that nuclear power production serves the
higher good of the well-being of mankind so that everyone is better off, even those
who belong to future generations. Even if—for a while—we take this argument for
granted, we can assert that the temporal distribution of benefit is not properly
incorporated into this line of reasoning. The current benefits are unquestionably
greater than the benefits for those who will be alive 100,000 years hence; this could
justify placing a higher burden on the present generation in order to establish a fair
distribution of burdens and benefits. So, the default situation should be that the
present generation remains responsible for the waste problem. If one then decides to
transfer parts of this risk to the future and if this necessitates putting remote future
generations at a disadvantage, then “the burden of proof is on the person who wishes
to discriminate,” as Shrader-Frechette (2002, 97) rightly stated.23
It is, however, quite reasonable to consider ways of reducing the burdens upon the
present generation, particularly the security burdens. After all, the additional
proliferation risks are the main reasons why countries like the USA have decided to
avoid reprocessing. In the first place, it is the significant quantities of highly enriched
uranium and weapon-grade plutonium emanating from dismantled warheads in the
wake of the Cold War that need to be taken care of. As proliferation is a significant
problem associated with reprocessing (and with the possible further deactivating of
waste through advanced fuel cycles such as P&T), serious attempts have been made to
avoid this problem. Proliferation-resistant technologies have been proposed so that we
can enjoy the benefits of reprocessing by, for instance, reducing the waste volume and
its waste lifetime; one of the serious alternatives worth mentioning is the Global Nuclear
Energy Partnership, alternatively known as GNEP (Pilat 2006).
5.3 Who in the Present Generation Should Bear the Burden?
The last objection that will be explored here is that of how the additional safety and
security burdens will be distributed between contemporaries and whether that should
be seen as relevant when addressing the intergenerational conflicts. Some scholars
argue that people who are disadvantaged in terms of income, education, or
occupation generally bear greater environmental and health risks; see for instance
Bullard (1994) and Bullard and Johnson (2000). Issues concerning the distribution of
burdens and benefits between contemporaries are known as intragenerational justice
or alternatively environmental justice.24
23 Shrader-Frechette disagrees with the claim that nuclear electricity benefits future persons and presents
two objections to this idea; see for more information (Shrader-Frechette 2002, 97–8).
24 Some scholars—such as Shrader-Frechette (2002, Ch. 5)—see the temporal inequality that arises from
the case of geological disposal of nuclear waste as an instance of environmental injustice. In this paper, I
distinguish between spatial and temporal justice by stressing that the former refers to environmental justice
and the latter to intergenerational justice.
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If we now accept these arguments by acknowledging that the least well-off in
society are indeed exposed to higher environmental risks and if we go on to
conclude that the latter violates the norms of distributive justice—as for instance
argued by Wigley and Shrader-Frechette (1996) in the case of a uranium enrichment
facility in Louisiana—then the question of whether the extending of these activities
is justified seems legitimate. To put it bluntly, can we justify increasing the injustice
among contemporaries and disadvantaging the least well-off in present-day society
in order to reduce the possibility of harming remote future generations? This casts
serious doubt on the extent of the moral legitimacy of the prima facie duty of not
harming future generations.25 This reasoning is however dubious as it assumes that
current injustice should continue. We can argue that if there is a problem
surrounding the distribution of burdens and benefits among contemporaries, we
need to address and solve this problem irrespective of any additional activity.
One might further argue that the dilemma presented is a false dilemma because
the choice should not be between injustice done to the present generation and
injustice towards the future as a result of nuclear power deployment. Perhaps, it is
rather the case that we should avoid nuclear power and choose instead other energy
provision systems. Even though such an argument seems at first glance defensible, I
shall refrain from getting involved in such a discussion here. Addressing the social
desirability of nuclear power production is indeed a very legitimate discussion;
however, in this paper, I have confined the analysis to different options for the
production of nuclear power in order to enable an internal comparison to be made
between different methods. In other words, before being able to compare nuclear
energy with other energy sources, it is advisable to be clear about the type of nuclear
energy (or fuel cycle) one has in mind and to appropriately address the spatial and
temporal distribution of burdens and benefits.
6 Conclusions and Recommendations
In this paper, I have considered the morally desirable option for nuclear power
production. In other words, assuming that we continue using nuclear energy, I have
questioned which technology we should deploy for its production. As nuclear power
production predominantly produces present benefits and carries deferred costs for
future generations and as we are in a temporally good position to visit costs on future
generations, I argue that the desirable option should be primarily formulated in terms
of the duties that present generations have towards posterity (1) not to jeopardize
future generations’ vital interests, something alternatively known as the no harm
duty and (2) to sustain future well-being insofar as that can be achieved with the
natural resources available. Fulfilling these duties brings with it the implementation
of certain technologies, all of which shifts the burdens and benefits for different
generations. The question, as correctly formulated by Brian Barry (1999, 94), then
25 See also in this connection Okrent (1999, 878) who states that there is an inherent conflict between
intergenerational and intragenerational equity: “[t]he millions of dollars spent today to save a relatively
few statistical lives thousands of years in the future could save many more lives during the current
generations.”
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becomes, if “we could provide a benefit or avoid a loss to people in the future at
some cost to ourselves, are we morally required to do so?”
In order to be able to answer this question and address these intergenerational
conflicts, I treated temporal duties as prima facie duties (or simply duty-imposing
reasons), alluding to the fact that they might be overruled by morally more important
duties. I argued that—in all-things-being-equal situations—the duty not to harm
future generations will be morally more compelling because of the type of goods
being protected (i.e., the vital interests) and because of the time span and the number
of generations involved. This supports the introduction of Partitioning and
Transmutation (P&T) fuel cycles in order to substantially reduce waste lifetime
periods. Such a fuel cycle creates additional safety, security, and economic burdens
for contemporaries; these intergenerational conflicts were further explored.
Three objections were raised to the additional burdens that emanate from P&T. The
first objection related to the possibility of disposing of the waste in geological
repositories, thus supposedly guaranteeing long-term safety. It was however shown—as
in the American example—that before we can design repositories, we need to violate the
equality principle with regard to remote future generations. The second objection
questions the legitimacy of these additional burdens for contemporaries. This reasoning
errs, however, as it shifts the burdens of proof. Assuming that the present generation has
predominantly benefited from nuclear power, the default situation should then be that
this generation remains primarily responsible for dealing with it; it is therefore the
transferring of these risks to remote future generations, thus putting them at a
disadvantage that requires justification. Indeed, there is every reason to reduce the
burdens upon contemporaries, especially proliferation risks as the consequences of an
accident or nuclear warfare would extend far beyond the present generation.
Technological solutions could be presented to such issues. The third objection relates
to the distribution of additional burdens among contemporaries. If one assumes
that the least well-off in society are generally exposed to higher safety and health
risks, one could argue that increasing such environmental injustice by applying
P&T would be highly undesirable. Even though this argument mistakenly
presupposes that current injustice should continue, it emphasizes the necessity
of addressing the intragenerational justice issue. To conclude, the morally
desirable option in terms of nuclear power production is primarily seen here as
that which safeguards the interests of future generations, after which we should
explore how the latter shift the burdens and benefits for contemporaries before
deciding whether the option chosen is sufficiently justified.
Since the introduction of atomic power for peaceful purposes half a century ago,
its deployment has engendered much public and political controversy. It is to be
expected that the recent nuclear accidents in Fukushima Daiichi in Japan will, more
than ever before, bring the debate to the forefront of controversy. Even though I
started this paper by circumventing the general desirability debate, it is worth just
stopping to consider what this analysis can potentially contribute to that particular
highly relevant public and political discourse. When reflecting on the desirable
energy mix, one needs to consider nuclear energy in relation to other energy sources;
the moral insight provided could help one distinguish between different fuel cycles,
all of which can facilitate a comparison between a certain nuclear fuel cycle and
another specific energy system. A similar analysis to the one I have given in this
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paper could be presented in order to include other nonrenewable energy systems
such as fossil fuels. Such analysis could help us to establish the desirable energy mix
in line with the notion of distributive justice which accounts for both spatial and
temporal burdens—benefit distribution between generations. The ensuing question
would then be: how can we balance the duties owed to present generations with
those owed to posterity? (Okrent 1999; Hillerbrand and Ghil 2008) There is at least
one fundamental philosophical question that deserves serious attention in this respect
and that is the problem of the incommensurability of burdens and benefits. In other
words, before we can assess the desirable energy mix, we must first find a unified
way to, perhaps qualitatively, compare and balance the intrinsically different burdens
and benefits that emanate from nuclear power production and other energy systems,
both in spatial and temporal dimensions.
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